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Guest Editorial
Integrated Circuit and System Security
H ARDWARE security is a research area that is simultane-ously mature (covert and side channels, security of cryp-
tographic systems, and watermarking have been extensively ex-
plored) and rather early in its development (physical, unclonable
functions, hardware Trojan horses, and other primitives and vul-
nerabilities are beginning to be explored). Moreover, hardware
security has a rich yet complicated relationship to classical algo-
rithmic cryptography and security. On one hand it tries to com-
plement this established field. On the other hand, it competes
with this field both in terms of outperforming on classical secu-
rity problems and solving previously unsolvable problems.
Mindful of the pitfalls and opportunities, our primary objec-
tive in organizing this Special Issue was to provide additional
impetus for research in hardware security. Currently, the field
is heavily dominated by testing, CAD, and IC researchers. We
hope that researchers from other security fields will find the
problems and the proposed solutions published here both inter-
esting and important.
The proper way to structure research and development tasks
of the overall hardware-based security fields starts with the iden-
tification of security primitives, protocols, and amplifiers. The
primitives include watermarking and physical unclonable func-
tions (PUFs). There have been a number of hardware security
protocols for hardware and software metering. However, these
protocols were monolithic and did not take advantage of the
modular research structures. Koushanfar’s conference paper on
IC digital rights management was the first work that created
security protocols using hardware security primitives such as
PUFs. The key idea is to use ramifications of process variations
that make each chip unique. The IC activation requires an acti-
vation key from the designer. Therefore, fabrication of nonau-
thorized ICs is prevented. The Special Issue version of the paper
focuses on establishing sound theoretical proofs that a broad and
realistic set of attacks is not feasible.
This paper is related to two groups of papers. One group con-
sists of a single paper on FPGA DRM. The second group con-
sists of three papers that provide theoretical treatment of hard-
ware security issues. Members of the COSIC research group at
Katholike Universiteit Leuven authored the FPGA DRM paper.
The paper presents one of the first protocols for a pay-per-use
licensing technique for hardware IP cores in the state-of-the-art
SRAM-based FPGA. The authors present a security protocol
that requires participation of a trusted third party while intro-
ducing a small implementation overhead. We can expect an in-
creased interest in developing and deploying these types of se-
curity protocols; over 100 000 FPGA unique designs are already
created this year.
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The first paper with a strong theoretical component is titled
“Proof-Carrying Hardware Intellectual Property: A Pathway to
Trusted Module Acquisition” and authored by Eric Love, et al.
This is the second effort to develop techniques for checking the
security properties of hardware specified in HDL code. The first
technique presented at DAC 2010 used the notion of a fully
specified design where all resources are used by the specifica-
tion at all times. The starting point of the new technique is the
popular proof-carrying code technique. The proposed system
automatically detects malicious HDL via formal verification of
the security policies upon which the code provider and the cus-
tomer agree.
Covert channels are one of the oldest and most studied
system security attacks. The NRL Network Pump is a popular
and widely advocated mechanism to reduce the impact of
covert channels in a multilevel secure system. However, until
now, the NRL network pump was not exactly characterized.
The team from the University of Illinois at Urbana and Naval
Research Laboratory used information theoretic analysis to
establish the conditions under which covert channels can be
closed using the NRL network pump.
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is themost popular and
widely used private-key cryptography primitive. It has been rec-
ognized quite early (in 1996) that any cryptographic implemen-
tation (including the hardware implementations of AES) can be
compromised using side channels including timing, power, and
electromagnetic radiation. In addition, AES secret keys can be
leaked by intentional injection of computational faults. Two ex-
cellent papers further advance the state-of-the-art of this type
of attack. The first is titled “Improved Differential Fault Anal-
ysis on AES Key Schedule.” The author, C. H. Kim, has pro-
posed a novel fault attack on AES by injecting faults during the
key schedule. Using the proposed method, the secret key of the
AES-128/192/256isanalyzedwithlowestcostintermsofnumber
of faults and steps of brute-force search with respect to the previ-
ouslypublished literature.Faultanalysison theAESkeyschedule
ismore difficult than that on the state because errors propagate on
both thekeyandthestatedata.Thesecondreasonis that faultanal-
ysis on the key schedule is harder to protect.While fault analysis
on the state can be prevented with state randomization methods,
fault analysis on key schedule cannot be prevented using that
method. A research team from The University of Electro-Com-
munications, Tokyo authored the second paper. The paper has a
theoretical component that explains why fault sensitivity anal-
ysis is possible against AES hardware implementations that are
already resistant to the differential fault analysis. The paper also
proposes several security measures against the proposed fault
sensitivity analysis.
Authentication is one of the first and canonical security tasks.
It is closely related to numerous other security tasks such as
Identification, hardware, software and data metering, and data
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verification. In hardware security, it has even more applications
and aspects due to its close relationship to the physical proper-
ties of devices. A team from the U.S. Air Force Institute of Tech-
nology at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, presents a new RF dis-
tinct native attribute fingerprinting technique to create a multi-
factor-authentication approach demonstrating the use of a com-
bination of measurements and data processing using statistical
techniques.
We wish to express our gratitude to the authors of accepted
papers for their high-quality research contributions and clearly
written manuscripts. We also thank the reviewers for their de-
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limited. Thus, we wish to thank the authors of all submitted
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about the work in which you are engaged. We also wish to thank
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